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Introduction
After initially being hailed as a promising climate change mitigation strategy (Schneider and McCarl, 2003; Pacala and Socolow, 2004; Farrell et al., 2006) , biofuels have since been implicated in driving up food prices and causing deforestation (e.g. Righelato and Spracklen, 2007; Fargione et al., 2008; Laurance, 2008; Scharlemann and Laurance, 2008; Tilman et al., 2009 ). Despite fears about these possible negative e ects, expansion of biofuels production continues apace (Rajagopal and Zilberman, 2007) .
Biofuels production is currently dominated by ethanol, most of which is produced by the US (maize ethanol) and Brazil (sugarcane ethanol) (IEA, 2007) .
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Global ethanol production is predicted to rise from around 60 billion liters in 2008, to 150 billion liters by 2018 (OECD-FAO, 2009 ). Producers' e orts to increase their supply capacity are based on expectations of future increased demand, provoked by higher fossil fuel prices, growing mandates for blending biofuels in fossil fuels used for transportation, 2 and the recent commercialization of Flex-Fuel
Vehicles.
3 Yet, with carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation and forest degradation accounting for up to one fth of global emissions of carbon dioxide (van der 1 First generation biofuels are divided into ethanol and biodiesel. Other producers of ethanol include Argentina, South Africa and India.
2 Countries with such mandates include Brazil, Canada, India, China and the United States, among others.
3 Flex-Fuel Vehicles are able to run with any blending of gasoline and ethanol.
1 Werf et al., 2009) , it is clear that evidence for ethanol production in causing forest conversion would considerably decrease its attractiveness as a climate change mitigation strategy. The available evidence, e.g. using life-cycle analysis, is not clear-cut and subject to ongoing research and analysis.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the current debate on the possible social and environmental e ects of ethanol production by investigating the impacts of production on land use, deforestation and food production. A partial equilibrium model is developed to map out and hence, better understand the channels through which ethanol production in uences the allocation of land and a mobile input, labor, for agricultural production.
One well-understood channel is the land market. Land is a limited resource allocated among di erent rival uses including forests. In competitive equilibrium, this allocation is such that the marginal net bene ts of each use equate. If, for any reason, one of these uses becomes relatively more pro table, it will be allocated more land, at the expense of the other uses in the same region. At the forest frontier, this direct land competition may entail deforestation (e.g. Angelsen, 1999 Angelsen, , 2007 Barbier, 2001) .
Energy crops for ethanol production can directly compete with forests for land (Chakravorty et al., 2008) . If their production becomes more pro table, this would increase incentives to clear land for energy crops. Although this argument applies when energy crops used for ethanol production are grown in forest frontier regions, it is far from obvious that it would still apply if energy crops are grown in regions where forest is not present. This argument is being used in Brazil, for instance, where ethanol producers claim that sugarcane expansion has no e ect on deforestation in Amazonia since production occurs at large distance from the forest, e.g. in regions such as the state of São Paulo in the south (see Goldemberg and Guardabassi, 2009 ).
Nevertheless, so-called \indirect" impacts of ethanol production have recently been discussed in the literature. The indirectness of these e ects is based on the idea that they are manifested even when energy crops and forests grow in di erent regions. 4 Searchinger et al. (2008) utilize a partial equilibrium computable model of agricultural markets to quantify the increased demand for land arising from US corn ethanol targets. This study shows the possibility of forests being converted to replace cropland diverted to corn production. It concludes that US corn ethanol has a negative net e ect in terms of greenhouse gas savings compared to fossil fuels when emissions from indirect land-use changes are taken into account. Although some drawbacks to the methodology used have been identi ed (see Gallagher, 2008) , this study is nevertheless the rst to take into account the possible indirect e ects of ethanol production. The market mechanisms underlying this e ect remain unclear, although Feng and Babcock (forthcoming) go some way towards clarifying these. Using a partial equilibrium framework, they investigate how US policies to promote corn ethanol production a ects total cropland area and its allocation among di erent land uses. They show how an increase in the ethanol price increases the total cropland area by increasing the returns on marginal land previously fallow. This gives incentives to producers to convert this land to agricultural production, including both corn and other crops. Feng and Babcock do not, however, include a residual forest in their model and hence, do not explicitly model how ethanol demand might impact on forest conversion.
Another possible indirect e ect of increasing ethanol production yet to be considered in the literature is that of changes in the demand for labor. Expanding biofuel production has been promoted as a means of increasing rural employment possibilities and improving livelihoods (e.g. Dufrey, 2007) . But with biofuel production displacing other agricultural production elsewhere, there is also the potential for labor to be reallocated to new agricultural areas carved out of forest.
Moreover, reduced demand for labor in ethanol production due to, e.g. increased mechanisation, could lead to labor moving elsewhere. Migration to forest frontier regions has long been observed in a number of countries. For example, landless migrants and small farmers in great numbers from all over Brazil regularly move to the Amazon in search of new land and agricultural possibilities (see Fearnside, 2008) .
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Additional to deforestation, biofuels production has also been implicated in having a negative impact on food production, again through land competition (e.g. Hubert and Moreaux, 2007) . The allocation of land away from food to the production of biofuels will, however, depend on various factors, some of which exhibit a substantial degree of uncertainty, e.g. newer generation biofuels may use land more e ciently than current biofuels technologies. 5 Although we focus primarily on how ethanol production might impact forest conversion, our framework also allows us to consider how it may a ect output of the food sector. We demonstrate that this e ect on the food sector materializes through both the land and the labor markets and that the presence of a residual forest can play an important role with respect to its magnitude.
In this paper, we develop a two-sector-two-input partial equilibrium model of a national economy, where two nal goods { an energy crop 6 and a composite good representing all other agricultural commodities (termed \food") { are produced in two di erent regions. The two primary inputs considered are land and a mobile input (labor). Land type, i.e. land productivity, varies across the two regions, one of which includes a residual forest. Property rights over the forest are considered ill-de ned, a common feature of developing and emerging economies (see Feder and Feeney, 1991) which are, with the exception of the US, the main current and likely future ethanol producers. Examples of such countries include Brazil, Colombia and India, among others.
Our results show that ethanol production can impact deforestation and food production in three distinct ways. First, there is the standard, direct-land-competition e ect by which forest conversion is increased while food production declines. Second, we characterize an indirect-displacement e ect whereby an increase in ethanol prices reduces inputs available for food production thus entailing a lower output.
This lower output may a ect food prices and trigger a displacement of food production towards the forest frontier. Consequently, deforestation increases while total food production decreases. While the approaches are broadly similar, the potential for forest conversion is what di erentiates our indirect e ect from the one formalised by Feng and Babcock (forthcoming) . Finally, a third indirect effect emerges which has neither been explicitly considered nor modelled in previous studies, and relates to the sectors' competition for labor and to this factor's mobility. This labor mobility e ect decreases food production but also deforestation by drawing potential migrants into the employ of the energy crop sector located in the non-forest region. Taken together and in contrast to previous research in this area, our framework o ers a relatively complete, integrated picture of how biofuels 6 production might in uence land use, deforestation and food production.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The three e ects are characterized in section 3. Finally, section 4 discusses the results and concludes.
The model
We consider a partial equilibrium setting with two inputs, land and labor, being used to produce two di erent agricultural goods { food and an energy crop. There are two regions in this model di erentiated by their land quality. Region 1 has land of better quality, e.g. for agricultural production, than region 2. Forest is present in region 2 but not 1. 7 The objective is to investigate how private agents allocate inputs to the two sectors { depending on output prices { and how these decisions impact on land use, forest conversion and food production.
In the following sub-sections, we describe the assumptions regarding the technology and the institutions embodied in the model.
Technology
Let X A and X B be the quantities of food and energy crop produced, respectively.
7 Forest land is generally not very productive for agriculture (Chomitz and Thomas, 2003) . 
The land factor
The amount of land available in region 1 (R 1 ) is xed and is used by both sectors, such that (A.1.1 ) R 1 = R 1A + R 1B , where R 1i ; i 2 fA; Bg corresponds to the amount of land in region 1 used to produce X i .
In region 2, besides the initial stock of land (R 2 ), agents can obtain additional land through forest conversion. Let R D 2 denote the total land cleared by the two sectors, and R 2i ; i 2 fA; Bg the amount of initial land in region 2 used to produce
; i 2 fA; Bg ; the quantity of deforested land used by each sector. Then the total amount of land used for agriculture in region 2 is
Producers face a cost depending on the amount of forest land they decide to clear. This deforestation cost is given by cR D 2i ; i 2 fA; Bg ; c > 0, where c denotes the unit \cost" of forest conversion, i.e., the cost of allocating time and resources to deforest one unit of land and prepare it for agriculture.
The labor factor
For simpli cation, we assume the total supply of labor to be inelastic. The economy's total labor endowment is denoted L. We consider that labor can be either immobile (A.2 ) or mobile (A.2 ), such that if L 1i ; i 2 fA; Bg are the quantities of labor used by each sector in region 1 and L 2i ; i 2 fA; Bg ; the equivalent for region 2, then the constraint over this input can be written as
, where the upper bar designs xed quantities;
, where only the total amount of labor available for the two sectors is xed.
2.1.3 The nal good production X i ; i 2 fA; Bg ; can be produced in both regions or just in one of them. The latter case represents the possibility that some crops can only be produced using particular types or qualities of land. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Brazil where sugarcane is mostly produced in the centre-south part of the country where the soil and climate suit sugarcane better than that found in the north (Goldember, 2008) . Similarly, sugarcane production is concentrated in certain regions of India such as the state of Kerala where conditions tend to be subtropical.
In order to take this possibility into account, 9 the production function of sector i 2 fA; Bg is given by
where 0 i < 1 is a parameter representing the factors' productivity di erence between regions 1 and 2.
The special case where the energy crop cannot be produced in region 2, due to agro-ecological constraints, can be represented here by B = 0. In both cases
Institutions
Sectors A and B are competitive and agents are price-takers regarding both output and input prices. We denote by P A and P B the world price of food and the energy crop, respectively. 10 While P B is always exogenously given in the model, we investigate, in case 2 below, the implications of relaxing our assumption concerning P A , i.e. having P A a ected by the quantity X A produced in the national economy.
Speci cally, in this case we assume
, where A represents the price elasticity of demand for good A in the world market. In the other cases , 1
9 We note that other crops such as corn and switchgrass may be more adaptable to di erent conditions than sugarcane.
10 Since we assume that all the energy crop is devoted to ethanol production, P B also represents the ethanol price. In the following, we will use the terms "ethanol" and "energy crop" interchangeably. and 3, P A is assumed exogenous (A.4 ).
Also, let P 1 and P 2 be the national land-rental prices. Wages are given by W 1 and W 2 . In the case where labor is perfectly mobile (A.2 ), the wage will be the same in both regions such that W 1 = W 2 = W . Note that wages vary across regions but not across sectors. This is due to the assumption that mobility within a given region is always possible. Input prices are always determined endogenously in the model.
The decentralized equilibrium
In this section we derive factor demands, quantities produced and the amount of deforestation in equilibrium.
The pro t of sector i 2 fA; Bg is given by
Applying (A.3 ), pro ts can be rewritten as
After rearrangement, the rst-order conditions for an interior solution write 11
and
Note that from (3) and (5) an interior solution requires P 2 = c at equilibrium.
This means that the cost of deforestation, given by c, must be equal to the market rental price of land in region 2. Otherwise, there are two possible corner solutions: either P 2 < c and then no deforestation occurs or, on the contrary P 2 > c, and producers would not use the stock of land of type 2 already available (R 2 ) and would prefer to clear forest. This paper will only consider interior solutions.
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In the subsections below, we present three di erent cases of equilibrium, in order to explore both direct and indirect e ects of ethanol production. First, we present the case where the energy crop is grown in the two regions. This implies that in region 2 there will be direct land competition between the three possible land uses. In the two following cases, we restrict the production of the energy crop to region 1, such that all e ects of an exogenous increase in the ethanol price on activities in region 2 will be considered as being indirect. These indirect e ects operate through the labor and land markets.
Case 1: The Direct Land Competition E ect
To illustrate the direct e ect of ethanol production on deforestation, we assume a xed stock of labor in each region (A.2 ). By excluding labor mobility we want to highlight the impact of using land to produce ethanol both on food production and deforestation. Moreover, we assume that both sectors A and B use land in the two regions (A.3 ). Finally, we consider the price of food P A to be exogenously given (A.4 ). 
The input demand functions
In this case, the input demand functions are obtained by using (1) and (2), substituting one into the other and rearranging to get
where = 1 > 0.
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In the same way, using (3) and (4), we get
These equations express the quantity of inputs the two sectors demand in order to produce a certain quantity X i , given output price P i . Also, using (8),
total forest conversion can be written as
The equilibrium land and labor allocations
Replacing the demand functions derived above in the constraints
, and L 2A +L 2B = L 2 one can compute the equilibrium factor prices
and W e 2 = c 1 2 6 6 4
, where e refers to equilibrium.
13 Using these prices and replacing them into the factors' demand functions we obtain the equilibrium input allocations
where i; j 2 fA; Bg ; i 6 = j.
These equations represent the equilibrium quantities exchanged in the input markets. From equations (11) and (13) we note that the equilibrium amounts of land used by one sector decrease in the output price of the other sector's nal good.
For instance, if the price P B of ethanol increases, ceteris paribus, the amount of land used by sector A in both regions decreases. This is because the energy crop becomes more pro table to produce and sector B consequently demands more land. There will then be a shift of land in favor of the energy crop sector, up to the point where the marginal rents of the two sectors equalize again. This mechanism also holds for the labor factor.
The equilibrium amount of forest conversion is given by
3.1.3 The Direct Land Competition E ect Proposition 1 Without labor mobility, and when the food price P A is given, deforestation is increasing in world ethanol price P B ; as long as B > 0.
Proof. Taking the derivative of (15) with respect to P B yields
1 which is positive, as long as B > 0 .
We term this the Direct Land Competition e ect. Ethanol production implies setting land aside to grow energy crops. This additional land use increases land competition and pressure on forests. We consider this e ect to be direct because the impact on forest conversion is only observable if the energy crop is grown at the forest frontier ( B > 0). In the case where B = 0, the equilibrium amount of deforestation given by equation (15) would be independent of the ethanol price
This result is standard and in line with theory explaining land-use changes by variations in marginal rents of competing land uses (e.g. Angelsen, 1999) .
This e ect has been observed in Brazil, for example, where ethanol producers have been found responsible for illegally clearing the country's rapidly-shrinking Atlantic forest. Proposition 2 Without labor mobility, and when the food price P A is given, food production is decreasing in ethanol price P B .
Proof. Proof of this proposition is obtained by analyzing equations (11) and (13), where the amount of land allocated to one use is, ceteris paribus, decreasing in the other good's price.
This second result establishes the rationale for fuel-food competition and is also in line with the previous literature on land competition among rival uses (ibid).
Case 2: The Displacement E ect
Similar to the Direct Land Competition e ect, the displacement e ect materializes through the land market. To isolate this e ect we maintain the assumption regarding labor immobility (A.2 ). Also, we set B = 0 such that energy crop production is restricted to region 1, to abstract from the Direct Land Competition e ect. Finally, although agents remain price takers, we now consider that the quantity X A produced in the country a ects the world price P A (A.4 ). This hypothesis corresponds to cases where the country's production represents a signi cant part of the world total production or where the goods investigated are only traded within the national economy, so that P A is a national price. The equilibrium amount of inputs used by the two sectors in region 1 are the same as presented in the section above, i.e. they are given by equations (11) and (12). Since sector B is restricted to region 1, it does not employ any labor in region 2. The equilibrium amount of labor for sector A in region 2 is given by L 2A = L 2 . Similar reasoning applies for land of type 2, such that R 2A = R 2 .
The equilibrium amount of good A produced is given by
Finally, the total amount of land conversion in this case is given by the following expression:
The Displacement E ect
Proposition 3 Without labor mobility and if the output price of the food sector P A is endogenous, then an increase in the world ethanol price increases deforestation, even if the energy crop and the forest are grown in di erent regions.
Proof. When P A is a ected by quantity X A produced in the country, then given (A.4 ):
From (16), we see that X A is decreasing in P B. Now, consider an increase in P B : Then, to restore the equality X A (P A ) A = 1, P A has to increase.
Finally, from equation (17), one can see that deforestation increases in P A .
Thus, an increase in P B induces an increase in P A , which increases forest conversion.
More precisely, the e ect of P B on P A works through the land market in region 1. In fact, a higher P B implies that the amount of land in region 1 used by sector B increases at the expense of sector A. Consequently, the total quantity of food produced is lower, which increases its nal price. 15 This increases the pro tability of deforestation in region 2: We term this the displacement e ect, meaning that increased marginal pro tability of ethanol may induce a displacement of other agricultural activities towards the forest frontier.
It is important to highlight that this result holds if and only if the quantity X A produced in the national economy is su ciently high to a ect the world price Proposition 4 Without labor mobility and if the output price of the food sector P A is endogenous, then an increase in world ethanol price P B decreases the total quantity X A produced in the country.
Proof. Taking the derivative of (X A ) e in equation (16) with respect to P B gives us
+ which is negative.
Note that the decrease in the equilibrium quantity of food X A depends on the variation of P A subsequent to an increase in P B , which depends on several parameters including the price elasticity of food, A .
17
17 This variation can be computed by solving for dP A dP B , which can be done by totally di erentiating X A = (P A ) A with respect to P A and P B and using equation (16) to replace for the equilibrium value of X A . The expression is nevertheless ambiguous:
1 .
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In this setting, the decrease in the amount of food produced due to the induced increase in food price is dampened by the possibility of creating new agricultural land through deforestation. As compared to the case where P A is exogenous, consumers of food are therefore less a ected from the increase in ethanol demand, although new food production will occur at the cost of the environment. This particular point can have implications in terms of policy choice. Indeed, the result above suggests that there is a trade-o between poor households' food security and environmental protection.
More precisely, in our simple setting, if policy makers opt for higher forest protection 18 then this will increase the cost of forest conversion. In turn, this diminishes the forest's ability to act as a bu er for the food price increase subsequent to an increase in the ethanol price. Higher food prices will consequently increase poor households' vulnerability. On the other hand, leaving the forests unprotected { so that they can be converted to cropland and thus mitigate the food price increase { implies potential environmental damages such as diminished carbon storage capacity and biodiversity losses.
Case 3: The Labor Mobility E ect
Here we aim to better understand how ethanol production may a ect deforestation and the food sector, but this time through the labor market. By introducing labor mobility, we show that the quantity of labor used in activities in region 1 has an in uence on the amount of labor available for activities in region 2 and hence, on the amount of forest clearing. From (15), deforestation is positively correlated with the amount of labor in region 2. In order to isolate this e ect, we again set B = 0 { such that sector B is only present in region 1 19 { and consider P A to be exogenous (A.4 ). Contrary to cases 1 and 2, we assume perfect labor mobility (A.2 ). The wage in both regions will then be the same and denoted W .
The ethanol sector maximization problem
Sector B now maximizes
. From the rst-order conditions of the problem, one can derive the demand functions of land and labor for sector B, which are given by
19 This implies, as in case 2 above, that
23 and
The agriculture sector maximization problem
Sector A uses land of both regions for its production. It then solves for
Using the rst-order conditions, the input demand functions of the sector are given by
and 
The Labor Mobility E ect
In order to demonstrate the Labor Mobility e ect, we proceed in two steps. First, we show that the wage level increases with the ethanol price. Then, we show how deforestation varies with the wage level. This represents an indirect e ect of ethanol price on deforestation. This e ect is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 With labor mobility, when the food price P A is given, and when ethanol is produced in a region di erent from the forest frontier, deforestation in the forest region is decreasing in the ethanol price.
Proof. Using equations (18), (20) 
Using the constraint L = L 1A + L 1B + L 2A and equations (19), (21), (23) and (24) we obtain the following expression:
From equation (25) we can see that, ceteris paribus, if P B increases, then W must increase as well, since P 1 and P 2 are given. Now, looking at equation (22) note that the amount of cleared land decreases with wage. Thus, an increase in ethanol price provokes an increase in wage because the sector demands more labor.
This in turn decreases deforestation.
Our results show that a higher demand for labor in the ethanol sector attracts workers to region 1. This reduces labor supply in region 2 thus lowering the potential for deforestation in the region. We term this the Labor Mobility e ect.
The idea that the reallocation of labor might indirectly drive forest conversion has not previously been considered in the literature. In principle, it could represent an argument for developing or expanding ethanol production in regions far from the forest frontier. Indeed, the energy crop sector has often been promoted as a potential source of employment for the rural poor (von Braun and Pachauri, 2006; Ewing and Msangi, 2009 ). Our framework indicates, furthermore, that increasing biofuels production may have the potential to lower the incentives for migration towards forest regions hence reducing pressure on forests.
Proposition 6 With labor mobility, when the food price P A is given, the quantity X A of good A produced in the country is decreasing in the ethanol price P B .
Proof. Using equations (18) to (24) and replacing these in the production function yields:
From the expression above, the quantity X A of good A produced is, ceteris paribus, decreasing in the wage W . We have already seen that the wage is increasing in the ethanol price P B (see Proof of Proposition 5 above). Thus, X A is decreasing in P B .
It is important to highlight that in this case, one can also observe the Direct
Land Competition e ect. In fact, additional to the increase in wage, a higher ethanol price P B further decreases X A by reducing the equilibrium amount of land allocated to sector A in region 1. Using equations (20) and (24) one can see that the equilibrium amount of land allocated to sector A in region 1 is given by
, which is decreasing in P B . As a consequence, an increase in ethanol price has a combined e ect through both the land and the labor markets, provoking a decrease in the production of food.
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Discussion and Conclusions
This paper investigates the direct and indirect impacts of energy crop production on land use, deforestation, and food production, through a partial equilibrium model of input allocation between the energy crop and food sectors. The model incorporates two regions of which only one contains forest. New land can be allocated to crop production via forest conversion. Three distinct e ects are highlighted and analyzed separately. In this section, we discuss the conditions under which each of the three e ects materializes. Table 1 The Direct Land Competition e ect (Case 1) is the one that has been most investigated in the literature (e.g. Angelsen, 1999) . Given a nite stock of land, the allocation of land to one particular use can only be undertaken at the expense of other uses. If the relative marginal pro tability of the energy crop sector increases, e.g. due to an increase in the ethanol price, a reallocation of land previously under rival land uses (food production and forest) in favor of the energy crop sector occurs.
The possible existence of a Displacement e ect (Case 2) has also been discussed in the literature, through the notion of indirect land use changes (e.g. Gallagher, 2008; Searchinger et al., 2008) . It expresses the fact that the increased pro tability of one agricultural sector can displace other agricultural activities towards marginal lands such as those under forest. Our results are in line with those of Feng and Babcock (forthcoming) as they relate to the impacts of an increase in the ethanol price on the food sector. Regarding impacts on deforestation, we show that there are two necessary conditions for this e ect to be observed. First, the energy crop has to be produced, at least partially, in the non-forested region, i.e.
away from the forest frontier. Second, the displaced activity has to be such that national production a ects the output price. If this condition is not satis ed, then the price of the potentially displaced good will not vary, leaving its pro tability 29 unchanged. Instead of a displacement of production one instead observes a simple direct reallocation of land between the two activities. It then becomes a Direct
Land Competition e ect with no e ect on deforestation.
Regarding the size of the displacement, it depends, among other factors, on how sensitive the food price is to a decrease in quantities produced, expressed by the elasticity A . Note, however, that the negative impact on the quantity of food produced is dampened by the possibility of new agricultural land emerging through deforestation. Indeed, the increase in the food price makes deforestation more pro table thus giving incentives to food producers to clear more land, a trend commonly observed in forest frontier regions (Angelsen and Kaimowitz, 1999; Barbier, 2001) . Newly available land is converted to food production, which lowers the food shortage induced by land conversion to energy crop production in the non-forest region, subsequent to the increase in ethanol prices. This e ect implies that governments and decision makers keen to promote ethanol production should focus on developing policy instruments to ensure that the displacement of food production is guided towards idle land. If such land can be converted to food production at relatively low cost, e.g. by proving technical assistance or building infrastructure such as roads to reduce costs to market, then this could potentially mitigate food price increases while preventing deforestation. Note, however, that if little idle land is available to mitigate the food price increase, our results suggest a trade-o between increased food prices and forest protection, both having implications for social welfare. For countries with little idle land, ethanol production should not be considered a desirable GHG mitigation strategy.
The Labor Mobility e ect (Case 3) is the other novelty of the paper. Of course, our model assumptions regarding labor { perfect mobility or total immobility { are extreme cases used to illustrate this e ect. In reality, agents' mobility is always imperfect and does not depend solely on wages. Other factors of mobility include the availability and quality of infrastructure, family ties and household composition, among others (Mincer, 1978) . Nevertheless, our results imply that in a context where the forest frontier is a suitable destination for poor rural households, the energy crop sector, when located in a non-forest region, may represent an alternative migration choice. This will particularly be the case when the energy crop sector is labor intensive and o ers higher wages compared to other agricultural sectors.
Conversely, a decrease in demand for labor for the energy crop sector, for example due to mechanization, could become an additional factor incentivizing agents to migrate towards the forest frontier. Finally, an increase in labor demand in the energy crop sector diverts labor force from the food sector thus decreasing food production. Moreover, if the food price is endogenous, we would expect to see additional upward pressure on the food price.
Our results show that the overall impact of ethanol production on food production is unambiguously negative: whether considering direct or indirect e ects, increasing ethanol demand drives down food output. The overall impact of ethanol production on forest conversion, on the other hand, is ambiguous. In particular, when considering the indirect e ects, increasing ethanol demand can both increase deforestation through the land market and reduce deforestation via the labor market (where there is free movement of labor). Which e ect dominates is essentially an empirical question. Further ambiguities result from remaining uncertainties regarding a number of parameters including the price elasticity of the food sector, the size of the displacement e ect, and the total land available for food and energy crops. Thus, the relative importance of these parameters in determining overall impact implies a need for empirical research on the impacts of ethanol production undertaken in a speci c context.
Finally, we acknowledge that our model is only relevant for contexts where forest might be vulnerable to deforestation, with weak property rights to forest land, and where crops can only be grown under certain conditions. Thus, of the two current major producers of ethanol, Brazil and the United States, our model is only directly applicable to the former and not the latter. 20 Nevertheless, our model also captures the cross-border indirect e ect of increasing demand for US corn ethanol as demonstrated by Searchinger et al. (2008) . More pertinently, there are a number of countries and regions of the world where the ethanol sector is in the process of being developed on a large scale. These include India and Colombia (see Lapola et al., 2009; Quintero et al., 2008) , which have stocks of natural forest vulnerable to deforestation and, along with Brazil, would form interesting case studies for further research. Such studies could then be used to derive more concrete policy implications to show under what conditions ethanol production could be expanded while minimizing negative impacts on deforestation and food production.
